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Abstract
Screening is a useful tool for identifying potential health issues; however, it can also
lead to overtreatment. Consequently, patients are sometimes harmed by unnecessary
treatments and there are cost implications. Overtreatment can also occur in other
areas of medicine besides screening and sometimes medical interventions are used
to improve performance rather than to treat disease. In this paper, a distinction is
made between the perspectives of the patient and the government. For patients,
autonomy is important, and they can refuse life-saving treatments, assuming they
have decision-making capacity. They can also choose to be treated to avoid a very
small risk or to improve their performance. For a government with limited funds, it is
important to focus on outcomes and fund those screening programmes and other
medical interventions that can potentially save the most lives or prevent severe dis-
ability. Governments also have the power to legislate to enable a level playing field
by prohibiting medications that improve performance, but there is no general consen-
sus about this, and regulations can only be applied to specific, well-defined activities.
The problem with overtreatment results from the different interests involved: auton-
omy is the guiding idea for patients and outcome is the guiding measure for societies.
A general solution will not be possible because of these inherent conflicting interests.
However, medical research may improve the identification and predictions surround-
ing any anomalies detected during scans and reduce the problem in practice for spe-
cific conditions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Overdiagnosis and overtreatment are related concepts. Overdiagnosis
refers to the situation in which a medical abnormality is detected, but
that abnormality is not harmful at the time of its discovery and may
never become so. It typically occurs in the context of screening, for
example, with mammograms1 or thyroid ultrasounds.2 These screen-
ing tests can discover small tumours, which may not become
dangerous cancers during a person's lifetime. However, once an
abnormality is identified, there is always a possibility that it will
become harmful in the future. This uncertainty may lead to over-
treatment.3 Overtreatment is not the only possible harm arising from
overdiagnosis, for example, the knowledge of the abnormality's pres-
ence can be stressful, even if one decides not to have treatment.
However, in this paper, the focus will be on overtreatment. With
overtreatment, patients suffer harm from unnecessary interventions
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such as an operation or chemotherapy to treat the identified abnor-
mality. In addition, these interventions must be paid for, either by the
patient, the government, or an insurance company; hence, over-
treatment should be avoided if possible.
Although typically occurring in the context of screening, over-
treatment can also occur in other areas of medicine. It has been
reported that children are overtreated for attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder (ADHD).4 Likewise, in some cases, these treatment
options could even be considered as cosmetic neurology5 or cognitive
enhancement6; this ventures into the realm of medication being used
to improve performance, rather than treat a disease. Thus, over-
treatment can occur in various areas of healthcare.
The key issue with overtreatment in the context of screening is
that it is not possible to know whether the identified abnormality will
become a problem later in life. There are two aspects to this: first,
there is a lack of predictive accuracy, we often do not know the
chances of a condition becoming harmful in the future for a particular
person; second, even if we were able to predict this accurately, we
would still need to evaluate whether the expected level of risk or
harm is acceptable and weigh the different forms of harm to deter-
mine what is acceptable.
Despite these problems with the accurate prediction and evalua-
tion of harm, patients still need to decide whether to have treatment
or not and governments need to decide which screening programmes
to fund. The concept of overtreatment is therefore important for indi-
vidual patients and at the societal level. Indirectly, the concept is also
important for healthcare professionals because it is their role to
inform both individual patients and the government.
In this paper, the arguments and factors that affect each level of
decision making will be discussed: patient, government, and
healthcare professionals. Traditionally, conceptual analysis has been
important in the philosophy of medicine. With conceptual analysis,
one investigates how a concept is used in standard cases and difficult
cases with the aim of finding a set of individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions that can be applied to contentious cases.7 The
first step in this process is generally to agree on a definition: in this
case to define ‘disease’ or ‘treatable condition’. However, in this situ-
ation there is no generally accepted definition of disease that is suit-
able. Furthermore, Ereshefsky argued8 that relying on definitions is
not useful in controversial situations with conflicting intuitions. Thus,
here, the arguments will focus on the underlying reasons for over-
treatment without placing emphasis on what is classed as a disease
and what is not.
It will be argued that different, and often conflicting, ideas guide
the reasoning at the individual patient level and the societal level.
From the perspective of an individual patient, it is important—at least
in western societies—that ultimately, they can make their own deci-
sion and that their autonomy is respected. From the perspective of
the government, focusing on the overall outcome, that is, a conse-
quentialist approach is most suitable. Thus, the problems with over-
treatment reflect the problem that there is no generally accepted
overarching moral principle balancing the interests of individuals and
the state, and a general solution for the problem of overtreatment will
therefore not be possible in the foreseeable future. However, further
empirical research may reduce the uncertainty about particular condi-
tions, and thereby decrease the extent of the problem.
2 | THE PATIENT'S PERSPECTIVE:
AUTONOMY IS CRUCIAL
The standard view in Western societies is that patients should be able
to choose what kind of care they are going to receive,9 assuming they
have decision-making capacity. Therefore, this discussion of over-
treatment will start by investigating overtreatment from the patient's
point of view.10 In general, regarding medical interventions, patients
can be in three different situations:
• the patient may be suffering from a condition that normally
improves with medical1 intervention,
• the patient may be suffering from a condition for which it is not
clear whether a medical intervention will be beneficial, or
• a patient may want something from a healthcare professional that
is not allowed.
The decision a person makes depends on factors other than the
above-mentioned categories. For example, if somebody is in pain, that
person will be far more likely to ask for possible treatment, even if it is
not clear that it will be beneficial. However, in the typical possible
overtreatment case, at the moment of decision making, there is no
discomfort, pain, malfunctioning, etc. that is so unbearable that it will
push a person to try a treatment, even one with unknown
effectiveness.
The least controversial condition is the situation in which the
patient wants something that is not legally allowed. Patients and
healthcare professionals should adhere to the law and there are limits
to what a patient can demand or request from their healthcare profes-
sionals, for example, a sexual relationship with a psychotherapist is
not allowed. Despite the apparent simplicity of this situation, there is
still room for ambiguity and controversy, for example, with body
integrity identity disorder. This is a rare condition whereby the patient
thinks that their leg or arm does not belong to them. As a result, they
want to have this limb amputated and sometimes even try to do this
themselves. Healthy limbs have been amputated in the
United Kingdom11 in sufferers of this condition, but it was considered
controversial when it occurred.12 However, these are exceptional situ-
ations, and normally patients and healthcare professionals must
adhere to the law.
Sometimes treatment is the best option according to medical
guidelines. However, patients are allowed to refuse treatment, assum-
ing they have decision-making capacity; autonomy means that people
are allowed to make unwise decisions. It is important to realize that
many advised treatments are not completely risk-free, for example, if
general anaesthesia is necessary, there is a risk of death of around
1:100,000 in developed countries.13 However, the possibility of a bad
outcome of an advised treatment is not the only reason that people
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can refuse treatment; autonomy also means that even in the hypo-
thetical scenario where treatment is completely risk-free, a person
could still refuse it if they wanted to. In short, people can make their
own decisions if they meet the legal decision-making capacity stan-
dard, even if those decisions are not ideal or could be considered
unwise.
3 | PATIENT AUTONOMY AND MEDICAL
UNCERTAINTY
The rationale behind screening is that abnormalities are detected at
an early stage, so that treatment can be effective. However, not all
abnormalities detected will become life-threatening conditions. For
example, population data from the Netherlands suggests that the
observed increased survival rate for breast cancer is probably mainly
due to improved treatment options and that approximately half of the
patients identified via screening were treated unnecessarily.14 Welch
et al1 analysed data from the United States of America, which
suggested that of the 162 small tumours detected per 100,000
women, only 301 will become invasive tumours. Unfortunately,
healthcare professionals currently cannot identify which breast abnor-
malities will become malignant.
Patients, therefore, must decide on the basis of limited data
obtained via studies at a population level. The studies and data are
often from different countries, which may well have a different base-
line rate for the condition; hence, the decision becomes even more
difficult as the data and findings may not be suitable for extrapolation
to the patient's locale. Another factor to consider is the percentage of
invasive breast tumours that could still be cured if detected later. This
percentage will change over time as treatments improve, but it takes
time to collect and analyse the data so healthcare practitioners often
are forced to rely on out-of-date information to aid their patients in
their decision making. Therefore, patients are in the unenviable posi-
tion that they must make a decision based on very limited and possi-
bly inaccurate data. The information they need for a fully informed
decision is simply not available.
The decision patients must make may well be influenced by the
chance of an abnormality becoming malignant, the uncertainty of
this prediction and the risk involved with treatment. Sometimes,
simply hearing the word ‘cancer’ may influence their decision15; but
patients should still be informed that there is a chance that the
abnormality will become malignant as they have a right to know.
People may also be influenced by the possibility of regret.16 They
do not want to be in a difficult (possibly life-threatening) situation
that they could have prevented, even if the chance of it happening
is small. The general idea of autonomy does not proscribe these
kinds of perhaps less rational factors from being taken into account,
and patients can make unwise decisions; although in the case of
some abnormalities discovered via screening both options—
treatment and no treatment—could be seen as a good decision. Fur-
thermore, it is very difficult to avoid the influence of irrational fac-
tors. This is true not only in the medical setting as even parole
decisions by judges have been shown to be influenced by mundane
factors such as lunchbreaks.17
4 | HARM OR BENEFIT FOR INDIVIDUAL
PATIENTS
Death is the ultimate form of harm that can occur for any patient.
Thus, it is clearly desirable to reduce the chances of finding cancers
such as breast cancer in an advanced stage when a cure is no longer
possible. However, in other situations, the boundary between accept-
able and unacceptable harm is vague, and people will have different
opinions about this.
Rogers and Walker18 asserted that an objective way to identify
harm is needed to prevent overdiagnosis and indirectly overtreatment.
They stated that other forms of severe harm, not only death, need to
be taken into account and they referred to Feinberg's concept of wel-
fare interests to clarify what constitutes severe harm. Welfare inter-
ests are defined as the criteria necessary to achieve a goal; health,
liberty, opportunities for social interaction and maintaining friend-
ships, are some examples. Rogers and Walker argued that a condition
should be treated when there is a significant risk of welfare interests
being reduced if it is left untreated.
Feinberg also describes ulterior interests as a person's ultimate
goals, for example, writing a novel or being a participant at the Olym-
pic Games, and so on. Rogers and Walker18 think that these interests
should not be included when determining whether a condition is
objectively harmful, even though the person may believe their life
would be better if their ulterior goals were met. However, ulterior
goals can still influence the decisions patients make. Athletes, for
example, may undergo operations or other treatments that non-
athletes would decline, or people who want to become fashion
models may undergo cosmetic operations. An ulterior goal can also be
a reason not to have an operation. Somebody who earns a living on
the catwalk may not want to have any scars and may therefore be
more in favour of a wait-and-see approach after a positive screening
result. If we accept patient autonomy, patients can exercise this
autonomy by basing their choices on their ulterior interests and
avoiding harm will always be a subjective decision.
The line between ulterior interests and welfare interests can be
vague, especially when looking at mental health. For example, ADHD
is common and Merten et al4 mention a report in which almost 20%
of the children studied were being treated for ADHD. One of the rea-
sons for treatment is problematic behaviour. However, there is a
boundary problem here as the difference between problematic behav-
iour and being a bit naughty is hard to define; thus, it is difficult to say
if this high incidence of ADHD is a result of overdiagnosis. It could
also be that the children's parents want the treatment to enhance
their child's concentration span and improve their performance at
school19; this could be classed as overtreatment if the child is able to
perform within the normal range without treatment. Whatever the
reason, any perceived benefits must be weighed against the disadvan-
tages and side effects of the treatment such as growth retardation.
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Similarly, students may want to take cognitive enhancing medica-
tion. Amphetamine-like medications may improve performance—
although, this is currently not certain20—in everybody, not only in
people with ADHD. Such medications are intended to improve con-
centration and cognitive function—two factors that are significant in
an exam situation. The problem with many competitive exams is that
the difference between participants can be minimal and, in this con-
text, it is very difficult to ensure that one only treats a specific deficit
and restores it to a normal level rather than giving someone an unfair
advantage. Take, for example, the following hypothetical situation:
student A would normally perform better than student B, but if stu-
dent B can take certain medications, he or she will perform better
than student A. However, if both can take the medication, A will per-
form better. What should one do if there is only one place available
on a course? Thus, healthcare practitioners may come under pressure
to prescribe5 to help a person increase their performance, even
though the symptoms of ADHD are minimal. This problem is dis-
cussed less often than the problems arising from screening, but with
cognitive enhancement, it can be argued that it should also be the
choice of the person involved. He or she may have to pay for the
medication themselves, but it should still be their choice.
In a related situation, musicians sometimes take medications such
as beta-blockers to address stage anxiety and to improve their perfor-
mance21; this is allowed. However, people who want to participate in
sporting events where concentration and a steady hand/lack of
nerves are required, such as Olympic shooting events, are not nor-
mally allowed to take beta-blockers as they are viewed as artificial
performance enhancers. Exceptions can be made for those requiring
beta-blockers to treat cardiac conditions, but if they are prescribed for
anxiety, this is not allowed.22 This seems to be a somewhat arbitrary
distinction, and it has been argued for a long time that clearer guide-
lines are necessary for such medications and other treatments that
could improve performance.23 However, personal choice remains cru-
cial unless there are specific rules relating to a medication's use, such
as the prohibition of beta-blockers in Olympic shooting events.
Patient autonomy is essential, and patients must make their own
decisions, even when it comes to possible overtreatment. If they want
to take their ulterior interests into account, they can do this and if
they want to make an unwise decision, they can do this as well. This
applies not only to the treatment (or non-treatment) of diseases, but
also to increasing their performance through medication; this is gener-
ally permitted unless there are legally binding rules to forbid it.
5 | THE GOVERNMENT'S PERSPECTIVE
Governments constantly make decisions about the life and death of
their citizens. This is obvious in the case of going to war, but govern-
ments must also decide whether or not to build safer roads for pedes-
trians and cyclists, whether or not to allow nuclear power plants to be
built, to name just a few examples. Hence, prima facie, a consequen-
tialist approach focusing on the outcome would seem to be the best
approach for both health and non-health-related risks.
Governments have budgetary constraints; hence, they cannot
avoid setting priorities. One could argue that governments should
always prioritize preserving lives as an outcome, but this may well
interfere with quality of life. For example, if one wants to prevent all
road traffic accidents, people should be forbidden from going out.
However, as we have seen with the Covid-19 lockdowns, this reduces
the quality of life for many and stifles the economy. Therefore, there
is a consensus that governments cannot only focus on preventing
death. However, there is no consensus about the minimum acceptable
level of functioning, but an objective standard should be employed to
enable clear guidelines and simple decision making that benefits the
majority of society.
In establishing a minimum level of functioning, the ED-Q5 scale is
often considered. This involves scoring five dimensions—mobility, abil-
ity to wash and dress oneself, anxiety/depression, pain and usual
activities,24 which are rated on a 3- or 5-point scale. The more basic
qualities such as self-care and pain have the advantage that they are
relatively easy to measure and these dimensions are useful, if not nec-
essary, to realize other projects and goals in life. This would make
them an ideal baseline level of functioning for governments to work
towards within their budgetary constraints. Beyond this baseline level,
it is not reasonable for the government or other public organizations
to fund procedures such as cosmetic neurology5 or similar measures,
so that people can fulfil their ulterior interests,18 although individual
patients can be guided by these interests, as stated previously. How-
ever, the question remains whether governments should focus on
something more than the ED-Q5 scale when establishing priorities.
One alternative is to consider welfare interests such as health,
bodily integrity, opportunity for social interaction, and so on, which
according to Rogers and Walker18 provide a measure of the level of
harm that one should try to prevent. Welfare interests are more diffi-
cult to measure and there is no validated scale available. For example,
some people with a chronic illness report that they feel healthy,25 but
this is not true for everybody with a chronic illness. People inherently
will have different thresholds for feeling healthy. Furthermore, like
ulterior interests, meeting every welfare interest will not be a realistic
outcome for everybody. Rogers and Walker in their description of
welfare interests refer to Feinberg26; however, one could argue that
Feinberg himself is not completely clear in his formulation of welfare
interests, particularly when considering recent research. For example,
he mentions on page 37 ‘the integrity and normal functioning of one's
body’ as one of the requirements for welfare interests, and he goes
on to say that without the fulfilment of welfare interests ‘a person is
lost’. However, research from Lindsey,25 for example, has shown that
people without normal functioning of their bodies often report having
fulfilling lives. For governments, promoting and financing a welfare
interest-based level of functioning as suggested by Rogers and
Walker18 would be very expensive; hence, when establishing what
aspects governments should focus on apart from death, very basic
capabilities such as the ones measured by the ED-Q5 scale are gener-
ally preferred.
There is some debate about what else governments should con-
sider besides death and it was argued here that it should be a very
4 HUBBELING
basic level of functioning. However, there is by no means a consensus
on how the risk of death and risk of loss of function should be
weighed against each other.
6 | BALANCING COST AND RISK
When it comes to screening, if there are ultimately no lives saved, the
government should not fund the screening programme. However,
screening typically will benefit some people and harm others. The pre-
viously mentioned example of population data from the Netherlands
suggested that approximately 50% of the patients identified via
screening were treated unnecessarily.14 However, one cannot identify
who will or will not need treatment and hence the choice is left to the
patient. Treatment is not entirely harmless as there will be the risk of
dying from general anaesthesia and/or side effects to consider. For
most people, undergoing treatment will not affect their long-term
basic level of functioning as measured by, for example, ED-Q5 scores,
although with treatment, whether necessary or unnecessary, their
level of functioning will be reduced for a limited period. Hence, even
with 50% being unnecessarily treated, it may still be worthwhile to
offer the treatment because lives will be saved.
Overtreatment is also related to treatments provided to increase
performance such as cognitive enhancers5 or beta-blockers.21 If this
medication is not prescribed, the patients will not die and their ED-Q5
scores will not be significantly affected, apart from perhaps a slightly
higher score on anxiety. Hence, it seems a reasonable decision for
governments not to offer public funding for this, especially when the
government does not have enough money to provide sufficient treat-
ments to prevent death or severe disability. The compromise is that
people can have these treatments if they want them, but they must
pay for them themselves.
Governments have other responsibilities as well, apart from man-
aging healthcare costs. In certain situations, it may be preferable for
governments or similar public bodies to agree to create a level playing
field, in the sense that everybody can have access to certain medical
interventions, or nobody can. This is particularly relevant for sporting
events. For the Olympic Games, the consensus is that natural talent,
training, and practice should be tested in a competitive game, and this
is not possible if medications are used by some and not others. For
example, the rules of Olympic shooting events state that participants
are not allowed to take beta-blockers, although exceptions can be
made for participants needing them for cardiac conditions.22 Along
with testing for illegal and performance-enhancing drugs, Olympians
can also be tested for beta-blockers, which has resulted in people
being caught and disqualified from the event (Olympics: Korean dou-
ble medallist expelled for drug use j Olympics 2008 j The Guardian).
Students may want to use cognitive enhancers to improve their
exam performance or concentration in general. Currently, the
established practice in education is that people should not use cogni-
tive enhancers.27 However, what is widely deemed acceptable
changes with time as technology and attitudes develop; for example,
it was established practice that people did not use calculators in
physics exams until relatively recently, whereas they are now
accepted in most exam situations. Thus, established practices can
change. Furthermore, monitoring whether people have taken forbid-
den medications is possible during the Olympic Games and during
training, but it is not feasible to check every student for the use of
cognitive enhancers5 during the preparation time for every exam and
during the exam itself. Similarly, one cannot test musicians for taking
beta-blockers21 during every concert.
Governments can and should forbid the sale and use of medica-
tions that are too dangerous. Similarly, governments could enforce a
level playing field for specific areas. This restriction is only possible in
specific activities where enforcement of the rules and sufficient test-
ing is possible and when there is a consensus about what a level
playing field entails.
Politicians—at least in democratic societies—have to be chosen by
the public. Therefore, their decisions are not based purely on factual
information. Sometimes, it is difficult to remove something that the
public has become used to, for example, screening opportunities and
facilities,28 even if the screening itself is not very effective. This is not
the only factor politicians must consider: sometimes people want
access to a new treatment,29 regardless of its cost and effectiveness,
for example, some cancer drugs may extend a terminal patient's life
by only a few weeks, at a high financial cost, yet the patient or their
family may request or demand the treatment. Because politicians
want to be elected again, they are not only influenced by efficiency,
but also by popular opinion. Similar to individual patients being less
rational in their decision-making, we also have to accept that politi-
cians will sometimes propose measures based on public opinion and
not on the latest science. To some extent, this is the price we pay for
living in a democracy.
In summary, governments and other public bodies are interested
in the outcome. Hence, governments should focus on the prevention
of death and severe disability. There is no priority for governments to
fund treatments to improve performance. Legislation to forbid medical
interventions to improve performance could be introduced by govern-
ments for activities in which having a level playing field is important
and where it is possible to check that the rules are followed.
7 | DOCTORS' AND OTHER HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONALS' PERSPECTIVE
Healthcare professionals must inform both patients and the govern-
ment. Patients and the government will ask different questions as
they have different interests.
In the case of possible overdiagnosis after screening, patients
need adequate information and doctors or other healthcare profes-
sionals must explain the problem clearly, including discussing the limi-
tations of the available data. Patients must make their own decisions
and when it comes to screening, in typical overdiagnosis cases, there
is something to be said for both decisions: treatment or no treatment.
Patients may ask their doctor, ‘what would you do?’. It is probably
best for the doctor not to answer this question directly, but to discuss
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with the patient the issues behind the question, namely that nobody
knows the right answer and that there are arguments in favour and
against treatment and that you, as a doctor, do not have access to
special knowledge.
Patients may also ask healthcare professionals for treatments to
increase performance. If it is legally allowed, there are no reasons
against healthcare professionals prescribing or offering such treat-
ments, but patients need to make an informed decision and it should
be explained that, currently, the evidence for their effectiveness is
limited.
Healthcare professionals can also be asked to give governments
advice regarding screening and possible treatments. Governments will
determine the priorities and they normally decide to fund the screen-
ing programmes that save the most lives. To reduce the chance of
overtreatment, future research should focus on identifying which
minor lesions are going to become malignant, because that would
solve the problem of overdiagnosis and overtreatment and indirectly
save costs.
Governments may also ask for advice regarding the funding of
treatments that improve functioning but do not reduce death or
severe disability. Governments may want a level playing field in cer-
tain areas, but this is ultimately a decision for the government not for
healthcare professionals. For the sporting competitions such as Olym-
pic shooting events, there are resources available to check for medica-
tion use. However, providing these resources to ensure a level playing
field for academic activities or other performance-based events repre-
sents a significant investment for governments, to the extent that this
may never be possible for every competitive exam or orchestral
performance.
In summary, healthcare professionals can advise patients, govern-
ments, and other public bodies about the present state of medical
knowledge; however, they cannot solve the problem of whether an
individual patient should have treatment, if the data are unclear. They
can advise a government which screening programme is most likely to
save lives, but ultimately it remains a decision for the government
whether or not to fund it.
8 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Overtreatment is a problem after screening because some patients
get interventions that they do not need. Patients may also ask for
treatments not to prevent death or severe disability, but to improve
their performance in competitive exams or sporting events.
In this paper, a clear distinction was made between the perspec-
tive of the patient and that of the government or other public bodies.
From these different perspectives, it becomes clear that a patient can
make their decision based on a variety of factors, including the proven
advantages and disadvantages, potential harm and benefits or simply
not liking something. For public bodies, it is essential to look at the
outcome: prevention of death and severe disablement and sometimes
also creating a level playing field. Furthermore, both individual
patients and governments can sometimes be influenced by less
rational factors, but this must be accepted in order to maintain a
democracy and respect patient autonomy.
There is no general solution for the problem of overtreatment
because of the different guiding ideas for patients and society:
autonomy and outcome. However, the government or other public
bodies can legislate against overtreatment in some specific situa-
tions and scientists may be able to offer much better predictions
based on the screening results to reduce overtreatment in the
future.
ENDNOTE
1 In this article, a broad concept of medical interventions will be used,
which includes psychological interventions.
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